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2016-02-18 来源:国外网站推荐 - 由[国外网站大全]整理 812

FBI在调查去年12月在美国发生的枪击案,要求Apple解锁其凶手Syed Rizwen Farook的iPhone。美国政府要求苹果提供「必要的技术协助」来解锁凶手的iPhone 5C,因为苹果的安全性功能妨碍了办案人员的调查。



A Message to Our Customers


The United States government has demanded that Apple take an unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order, which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand.


This moment calls for public discussion, and we want our customers and people around the country to understand what is at stake.


The Need for Encryption


Smartphones, led by iPhone, have become an essential part of our lives. People use them to store an incredible amount of personal information, from our private conversations to our photos, our music, our notes, our calendars and contacts, our financial information and health data, even where we have been and where we are going.

以iPhone为首的智慧型手机,已经变成了我们日常生活中不可或缺的一部分。人们用它来 ​​储存为数惊人的个人资讯,从私人的对话到照片、音乐、笔记、行事历、通讯录等等,还有财务状况、健康资料,甚至连我们去过哪里都有。

All that information needs to be protected from hackers and criminals who want to access it, steal it, and use it without our knowledge or permission. Customers expect Apple and other technology companies to do everything in our power to protect their personal information, and at Apple we are deeply committed to safeguarding their data.


Compromising the security of our personal information can ultimately put our personal safety at risk. That is why encryption has become so important to all of us.


For many years, we have used encryption to protect our customers’ personal data because we believe it’s the only way to keep their information safe. We have even put that data out of our own reach, because we believe the contents of your iPhone are none of our business.


The San Bernardino Case


We were shocked and outraged by the deadly act of terrorism in San Bernardino last December. We mourn the loss of life and want justice for all those whose lives were affected. The FBI asked us for help in the days following the attack, and we have worked hard to support the government’s efforts to solve this horrible crime. We have no sympathy for terrorists.


When the FBI has requested data that’s in our possession, we have provided it. Apple complies with valid subpoenas and search warrants, as we have in the San Bernardino case. We have also made Apple engineers available to advise the FBI, and we’ve offered our best ideas on a number of investigative options at their disposal.

当FBI 要求我们提供我们可以给予的资料时,我们也提供了。苹果接受了法院的传票,我们也授权苹果的工程师给予FBI 建议,在协助调查上,我们尽一切的可能给予帮助。

We have great respect for the professionals at the FBI, and we believe their intentions are good. Up to this point, we have done everything that is both within our power and within the law to help them. But now the U.S. government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create. They have asked us to build a backdoor to the iPhone.

我们也相当尊重FBI 的专业,我们也相信FBI 的动机是好的。在能力所及以及合法的前提上,我们能协助的地方都给予协助了。但现在美国政府要求我们给予我们根本没有的东西,而且我们也认为是不妥的东西。他们要求我们在iPhone 上提供一个后门。

Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.

更确切的来说,FBI希望我们能够建构一个新的iPhone 系统,躲避维护安全的义务,安装一个可以在调查期间协助FBI 取得资料的后门。如果这个后门落入了不对的人手上,那么这个软体(指后门)-虽然现在还不存在-将会有可能被任何人取得资料。

The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor. And while the government may argue that its use would be limited to this case, there is no way to guarantee such control.


The Threat to Data Security


Some would argue that building a backdoor for just one iPhone is a simple, clean-cut solution. But it ignores both the basics of digital security and the significance of what the government is demanding in this case.


In today’s digital world, the “key” to an encrypted system is a piece of information that unlocks the data, and it is only as secure as the protections around it. Once the information is known, or a way to bypass the code is revealed, the encryption can be defeated by anyone with that knowledge.


The government suggests this tool could only be used once, on one phone. But that’s simply not true. Once created, the technique could be used over and over again, on any number of devices. In the physical world, it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks — from restaurants and banks to stores and homes. No reasonable person would find that acceptable.


The government is asking Apple to hack our own users and undermine decades of security advancements that protect our customers — including tens of millions of American citizens — from sophisticated hackers and cybercriminals. The same engineers who built strong encryption into the iPhone to protect our users would, ironically, be ordered to weaken those protections and make our users less safe.


We can find no precedent for an American company being forced to expose its customers to a greater risk of attack. For years, cryptologists and national security experts have been warning against weakening encryption. Doing so would hurt only the well-meaning and law-abiding citizens who rely on companies like Apple to protect their data. Criminals and bad actors will still encrypt, using tools that are readily available to them.


A Dangerous Precedent


Rather than asking for legislative action through Congress, the FBI is proposing an unprecedented use of the All Writs Act of 1789 to justify an expansion of its authority.

与其在国会向立委们询问这件事,FBI选择用1789年的All Wrists Act来为其辩护。

The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force,” trying thousands or millions of combinations with the speed of a modern computer.

政府要求我们移除安全性功能,并提供后门,这样iPhone 将会被暴力破解,百万计的密码组合在电脑面前,将会在几秒内被破解。

The implications of the government’s demands are chilling. If the government can use the All Writs Act to make it easier to unlock your iPhone, it would have the power to reach into anyone’s device to capture their data. The government could extend this breach of privacy and demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access your phone’s microphone or camera without your knowledge.

政府的这项要求是令人不寒而栗的。如果政府用All Wrist Act 来要求我们解开你的iPhone,等于任何人都可以取的这些资料了。政府甚至可能扩大这项权利的解释而要求苹果制作监控软体来监控你的讯息、取得你的健康资料、财务资料、追踪你的位置,或什至在你不知情的情况下入侵你的手机相机或麦克风。

Opposing this order is not something we take lightly. We feel we must speak up in the face of what we see as an overreach by the U.S. government.


We are challenging the FBI’s demands with the deepest respect for American democracy and a love of our country. We believe it would be in the best interest of everyone to step back and consider the implications.

我们反抗了FBI 的要求,是因为我们尊重美国的民主,而且爱着我们的国家。我们相信大家若能退一步思考这件事带来的后果会是最好的。

While we believe the FBI’s intentions are good, it would be wrong for the government to force us to build a backdoor into our products. And ultimately, we fear that this demand would undermine the very freedoms and liberty our government is meant to protect.

当然我们仍然相信FBI 的动机是好的,但要求我们建立后门这件事是错的。而我们最担心的,是这件事将威胁到我们的自由及安全-这些美国政府理当要守护的东西。

Tim Cook,February 16, 2016,原文“A Message to Our Customers